City University of New York (CUNY)

CUNY Academic Works
Dissertations and Theses

City College of New York

2013

The Price of Okinawa's Reversion; The Secret Negotiation of Dr.
Jones, Yoshida, and their "Friends", US-Japan Relations in Post
War Years
Miho Setoyama
CUNY City College

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cc_etds_theses/174
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY).
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu

The Price of Okinawa’s Reversion: The Secret Negotiation of Dr. Jones, Yoshida and
their “Friends”, US-Japan Relations in the Postwar Years

by
Miho Setoyama
Professor Daigle, Advisor
May 14, 2013

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Master of Arts of the
City College of New York of the City University of New York

1

Table of Contents
I.

Introduction

II.

Surrender, Occupation and Independence

III.

Before the Negotiation

IV.

The Backchannel, Jones, Yoshida, and their Friends

V.

The Complication, Nuclear and Textile

VI.

The Summit and the Aftermath

VII.

Conclusion

VIII.

Bibliography

2

I.

Introduction

Okinawa Islands, site of one of the bloodiest battlefields of the Pacific War, had been
under United States’ military rule since the end of World War II. In the postwar years, as
the Cold War intensified from the Korean War and the expansion of the Vietnam War, U.S.
occupation of Okinawa lasted until the islands reverted to Japan in 1972.
Since 1951, because of the Japanese Peace Treaty, the United States government
gained administrative rights over Okinawa and had largest naval and air bases in the Far
East. While controlling Okinawa, the United States used their bases for storing nuclear
weapons and mounting operation outside Japan, mainly air strikes over Korea and
Vietnam. Despite its subtropical climate and its unique culture as an independent
kingdom called Ryukyu Islands, Okinawa became a keystone for the US military strategy
in the Far East.1
With the end of the WWII, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP),
which was knows as General Headquarters (GHQ) in Japan, carried out the occupation of
Japan. The most significant reformation which GHQ wanted to achieve was creating a
democratic political system by writing a new constitution. To make Japan a stable and
peaceful nation, writing Article IX which declared the “Renunciation of War” was

1

U.S-Japan Security Treaty, Article VI, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Official Website.
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necessary for GHQ.2 GHQ’s democratic policies had greatly influenced the Japanese
society and reconstructed the county from the devastation. Because of the United States
generous support of sharing its technology and financial resources with Japan and GHQ’s
democratic policies, Japan could achieve economic and institutional growth like no other
county had ever achieved before.3
In contrast with the rapid and sustained growth of the Japan’s economy in the
postwar years, the experience of being an only victim of the atomic bombs in August
1945 left great pain on the hearts of the Japanese people. Because of this traumatic
experience, the Japanese adopted a new constitution, which under Article IX, required a
“permanent renunciation of war” and not maintaining “land, sea, and air forces, as well as
other war potential.” Therefore, for the Japanese people who developed a feeling of
victimization of the atomic bombs, the return of Okinawa from the United States was the
first and most important national issue after the defeat in the war.
The negotiation of the reversion of Okinawa began with Prime Minister Eisaku
Sato’s slogan during the presidential campaign of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in
1964. He left his famous quote, “until the reversion of Okinawa is achieved, the Japan’s
postwar period will not be over,”4 when he made his visit to Okinawa in 1965 and

Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan: The Story of A Nation, (New York, Alfred A. Knopf,
Publisher, 1981), 221-229. See also, Walter Lafeber, The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations
throughout History, (New York, W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), 262-275.
3 Reischauer, Japan, 270-271.
4
Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda expressed the Japanese economy was “no longer be termed postwar.”
2

4

received strong public support.
Certainly, from experience of the atomic bombs dropped on Nagasaki and
Hiroshima in 1945, the Japanese strongly opposed the United States decision to place
nuclear weapons in Japan. However, as the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists analyzed, the
Japanese people’s “nuclear allergy” was hard to cure,5 the United States’ government
removed non-nuclear bomb components from Japan in mid-1965. Yet, because of the
1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty allowed the U.S. government, they could use bases and
port facilities in Japan for transit of nuclear weapons.6 Okinawa hosted 19 different types
of nuclear weapons during the Cold War era, from December 1954 to 1972. Since
Okinawa was detached from mainland Japan during the U.S. occupation, the public
reaction was overwhelmingly negative to the U.S. storage of nuclear weapons in Okinawa.
To reflect this particular sentiment of the Japanese people against nuclear weapons, Sato
declared the “three Non-Nuclear Principles” of not possessing, producing and permitting
the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan and insisted on a nuclear-free reversion of
Okinawa.
At the first Nixon-Sato summit in November 1969, the President expressed his

(1956 Economic White Paper) Prime Minister Sato’s quote was from Ikeda’s expression.
5
Robert S. Norris, William M. Arkin, Willam Burr, Where They Were, (1999 The Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, November/December 1999), 31.
6
Norris, Arkin, Burr, Where They Were, 26-35. See also: 1960 nen 1 gatsu no anpokaiteiji no
kakumochikomi ni kansuru iwayuru “mitsuyaku” mondaikanren houkokutaishoubunsho, (Documents
regarding on so-called “secret agreement” in times of revising the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960,
January.), Doc#2-5.
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“deep understanding”7 to the Japanese aversion of nuclear weapons and made a secret
agreement with Sato to remove all US nuclear weapons from Okinawa except in times of
“great emergency”, where the Japanese government would be compelled to allow the
“re-entry” and “transit” rights of nuclear weapons in Okinawa for the defense of the
counties in the Far East.8 The government of Japan kept Sato’s acceptance of the
requirements of the negotiation secret for over four decades, fearing that to .
In 1994, however, Kei Wakaizumi, a secret emissary of Prime Minister Sato,
published his personal account of the Okinawa negotiations that revealed the existence of
the secret agreement. Wakaizumi, a scholar of international politics, made clear that
during the negotiations Sato agreed to allow to reintroduce nuclear on Okinwa in times of
great emergency. He also addressed the question in his account of whether Japan, despite
its undoubted leading economic position, would be able to offer a more “universal
expression of its distinctive Japanese principles.”9 Wakaizumi revealed his concern that
“the country lost sights of its spiritual, cultural, and ethical roots.”10
Wakaizumi committed suicide right after he submitted his draft to the publisher
7

Joint Communique between President Richard Nixon and His Excellency Prime Minister Eisaku
Sato, November 21, 1969, Digital National Security Archive (DNSA), Japan and the U.S., 1960-1976, Doc#
JU01174.
8
Kei Wakaizumi, Tasaku nakarishiwo shinzemuto hossu, (I Wish I Could Believe There Were No
Other Option), (Tokyo, Bungeishunjyu, 1994). See also, Iwayuru “Mitsuyaku” ni kansuru
gaimushouchousahoukokusho (Report of the So-Called “Secret-Agreement” of the MOFA.): The draft of
Agreed Minute to Joint Communique of Nixon and Sato, November 21, 1969) was attached to Wakaizumi’s
Tasaku. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that the Agreed Minute of Joint Communique which
Nixon and Sato was found from Sato’s former house.
9
Kei Wakaizumi, The Best Course Available; A Personal Account of the Secret U.S.-Japan Okinawa
Reversion Negotiation, (University of Hawaii Press, 2002), 335. See also, Wakaizumi’s Tasaku, 616.
10
Wakaizumi, The Best, 335.: See also, Wakaizumi’s Tasaku, 616.
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for the English language version to take the responsibility for revealing the
secret-agreement in 1996.11 Compared to the Japanese language-version, the
English-language version, The Best Course Available, is much shorter and misses out
Wakaizumi’s agonizing dilemma between his self-affirmation and his feeling of guilt.
During the secret negotiation with Kissinger, Wakaizumi sacrificed everything for the
nuclear-free reversion. Despite his status as a private person, he devoted himself to secret
negotiation over the reversion and he committed his mission without telling anyone,
including his wife.12
His deep and immeasurable sense of regret about trading off between textile
issue and Okinawa can be seen in his account. However, the price of the reversion was
higher than textile issue. Almost 25 years after the negotiation, his view toward Japan was
full of disappointment. In the English-language version, Wakaizumi referred Japan in the
postwar years as a country which “has been preoccupied with material, often narrowly
selfish concerns,”13 yet he even referred the country as “fool’s paradise” in his
Japanese-language version.14
Sixteen years after the publication of Wakaizumi’s memoirs, the Japanese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which had long denied this allegation that they had allowed
11

Ryuichi Teshima, “Henbousuru Nichibeidoumei” (Changing the Alliance between the U.S. and
Japan), (Ryukyu Shinpo, Ryukyu Forum Vol. 171, July 2007), 7. See also: NHK (Japan Broadcasting
Corporation), “NHK Supesharu Missi Wakaizumi Kei Okinawahenkan no Daishou”(NHK Special, Kei
Wakaizumi, The Okinawa Reversion’s Cost), November 17, 2012.
12
Wakaizumi, Tasaku, Acknowledgement.
13
Wakaizumi, The Best, 335.
14
Wakaizumi, Tasaku, 616.
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U.S. nuclear-armed ships to sail into Japanese ports, finally admitted the existence of the
secret agreement by releasing the information that Wakaizumi had provided in his
memoirs.15 The documents that have been declassified by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MOFA), as well as by the United States government, and Wakaizumi’s personal account
revealed a secret backchannel for negotiation between Tokyo and Washington among “Dr.
Jones” (Henry Kissinger), “Mr. Yoshida,” (Wakaizumi), and their “friends” (Nixon and
Sato).
The documents of both sides demonstrate that the secret negotiations went
beyond the Okinawa negotiations and were, in fact, closely tied to both Nixon and Sato’s
political predicaments. As part of his “Southern Strategy,” Nixon promised southern
textile producers that he would protect them from Japanese textile imports, because of the
lower price of Japanese textiles and the refusal of Japanese companies to stop exporting
them to the United States. This guarantee unexpectedly made the negotiations over
Okinawa’s reversion much more complicated.
The historiography of the US-Japanese relations during the Nixon
administration and of the secret negotiation over the reversion is still very limited. The
most detailed account remains I.M Destler, Haruhiro Fukui, and Hideo Sato’s, The Textile
Wrangle: Conflict in Japanese-American Relations, 1969-1971. However, this study

15

Iwayuru “Mitsuyaku” ni kansuru gaimushouchousahoukokusho (Report of the So-Called
“Secret-Agreement” of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.), (March 5, 2010).
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focused more on the textile trade dispute between Washington and Tokyo than on the
secret agreement on the reversion of Okinawa. Destler, Fukui, Sato treated the textile
issue as not “just an economic issue, but as a political issue and as a case study in
crisis.”16 They argued that “the textile wrangle” was “the product of typical patterns of
intergovernmental bargaining and of typically fallible human being working in an
atypically difficult period of U.S.-Japan relations and perhaps cursed by atypically bad
luck as well.”17
Chalmers Johnson’s MITI and The Japanese Miracle examined Japan’s miraculous
economic growth from the perspective of Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI). Johnson pointed out that Sato traded textiles for Okinawa and Sato’s failure of
delivering his promise with Nixon. However, Johnson did not devote pages to the textile
conflict in the 70’s and Okinawa’s reversion.18 Other work of Johnson, as an editor,
Okinawa: Cold War Island, offers a selection of essays on the Battle of Okinawa,
Okinawan identity, the rape incident and the rekindling of Okinawan protest against the
bases, the U.S-Japan Security Treaty, and so on. Johnson pointed out that after the
reversion of Okinawa, “instead of being an American military colony directly ruled by the
Pentagon,” Okinawa turned to be “an American military colony superficially legitimized

16

Destler, Fukui, Sato, The Textile Wrangle, 9.
Destler, Fukui, Sat, The Textile Wrangle, 338.
18 Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle; The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975,
(Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1982), 285, 292.
17
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by the Japanese-American Security Treaty.” He argued that even after the reversion,
“nothing changed.”19 Johnson’s view toward the Japanese government is extremely
critical. Johnson argued that the Japanese government won a peace in exchange of letting
the United States military occupy Okinawa indefinitely and the Japanese government kept
betraying Okinawa, and the reversion was the betrayal of Okinawans by Japan and the
U.S. However, his perspective of the reversion was mainly from local Okinawans and he
overlooked the reversion of Okinawa as a national issue. As well as Johnson’s, the
perspectives of other authors of the book were from local Okinawans and they tend to be
compassionate for people who involves “a high level of fear and anxiety that they might
be robbed, raped or killed” by American soldiers.20
In Japan, the collection of essays which dealt with the complete history of the
U.S-Japan relations “Nichibeikankeitsushi” (The History of U.S.-Japan Relations) was
published in 1995. In “Nichibeikankeitsushi”, Osamu Ishii touched on Wakaizumi’s
“secret agreement” and he pleads that the reversion of Okinawa removed a major barrier
for the U.S-Japan partnership and post war period was finally over.21 In 2010, Hisayuki
Miyake, a Japanese journalist argued that the reversion of Okinawa was achieved just
because Prime Minister Sato was lucky. Miyake analyzed the reversion as the effects of
19

Chalmers Johnson, Okinawa: Cold War Island, (New Mexico, Japan Policy Research Institute,
1999), 5-7.
20
Johnson, Okinawa, 7. See also other authors of Okinawa: Kozy Amemiya, Carolyn Bowen Francis,
Gavan McCormack, Mike Millard, Masahide Ota, Steve Rabson, Masayuki Sasaki, Masayuki Sasaki,
Patrick Smith, Koji Taira, and Shunji Taoka.
21
Chihiro Hosoya, Osamu Ishii, et al, Nichibeikankeitsushi (The U.S.-Japan Relation Complete
History), (Tokyo, University of Tokyo Press, 1995),216-219.
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fortune because the United States’ military strategy was changing at that time.22
The other major study of the Okinawa reversion negotiations was recently
produced by the Japanese government. Following the revelation of the secret agreement,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs set up an advisory panel of Japanese historians and
published the report in October 2010, Iwayuru “Mitsuyaku” ni kansuru
yuushikishaiinkaihoukokusho (Report of the so-called “secret-agreement” of an
investigation team). The investigation team focused on archival research from the United
States, Japan and also local Okinawan archives.23 After their exhausting archival research,
the investigation pointed out the Japanese government’s poor management of its
archives.24 The investigation team stressed that there were many cases of missing
documents, and suggested that the Japanese government provide additional research into
the absence of these archival records.
However, the investigation team as well as other major newspapers in Japan
focused too much on the declassification of documents and the public’s right to access
this information, overlooking the central issue at hand: Sato and Nixon’s secret agreement
on nuclear weapons. Because the deal so shocked the Japanese people, it is essential to
see this secret agreement over the reversion of Okinawa as a failure of postwar Japan, as a
22

Hisayuki Miyake, Kakenakatta Tokudane: Showa~Heiwa Seiji 25 no Jijitsu (Things that I Could
Not Write, 25 Truth), (Tokyo, Seishunshinsha, 2010),69-74.
23
An Investigation Team (Shinichi Kitaoka, Sumio Hatano, Yasuko Kohno, Kazuya Sakamoto,
Takuya Sasaki, Mikio Haruna), Iwayuru “Mitsuyaku” ni kansuru yuushikishaiinkaihoukokusho (Report of
the so-called “secret-agreement” of an investigation team), (MOFA, 2010), 2-3.
24
Ibid, 95-107.
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part of the Cold War, and the traumatized memory of the Pacific war.
This thesis will fill this historiographic gap by arguing that the Okinawa
reversion negation, which was to Prime Minister Eisaku Sato’s crowning achievement,
was in actuality a complete failure. Even though Japan regained sovereignty over
Okinawa, which technically ended Japan’s postwar period, the secret agreement upheld
the status quo, allowing the U.S. to utilize its military bases on Okinawa in any way they
wish, including the storage of nuclear weapons. Although other historiography, such as
Johnson’s Okinawa: Cold War Island, treat the reversion Okinawa as an Okinawa’s
problem, this thesis will examine the issue as Japan’s national issue.
Moreover, the declassified documents from Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well
as DNSA and Wakaizumi’s memoirs posed several new questions which the investigation
failed to address in its report of the so-called “secret-agreement”. Was the secret
agreement only the option available to Prime Minister Sato and Wakaizumi? How much
were they willing to sacrifice for the reversion of Okinawa? What made Wakaizumi to
commit suicide after he revealed the secret negotiation, which he was not supposed to
reveal? On the other hand, how did Nixon and Kissinger treat this issue?
The negotiation of Okinawa’s reversion was an extremely unusual case. For Japan,
this was principally an “effort to regain lost territory,”25 and a critical national

25

Wakaizumi, Tasaku, 455.

12

sovereignty issue to maintain a nuclear-free reversion. For the United States, however,
Okinawa was the land that they won in the Pacific War and Nixon sought to use his
leverage with the Japanese to extract important concessions on textiles. As Wakaizumi
revealed in his account, “Dr. Jones” and “Mr. Yoshida” agreed to link Okinawa’s
reversion with Nixon’s “sour point” of textiles.26
After Nixon’s announcement of the nuclear-free reversion of Okinawa, Sato was
supposed to regulate Japanese textile exports to the United States. As it turned out, Sato
failed to control the textile industry and could not deliver on his promise. Sato’s
diplomacy, which was referred as “trading textiles for Okinawa” (ito wo utte, nawa wo
katta)27 failed and Nixon’s intention to arrange in return for Prime Minister Sato’s major
political issue, reversion of Okinawa, was betrayed.
Nonetheless, as most of the primary documents and the secondary documents show
regarding postwar Japan, after the defeat in the World War II, rebuilding the country was
the number one priority. Japan’s economic growth was nothing short of miraculous. With
new wealth, people sought to make their lives as comfortable as possible, although they
were still struggling from the memory of the war, especially of the atomic bombs in
Nagasaki and Hiroshima.
After the negotiation, Okinawa’s reversion to Japanese administration was

26
27

Henry Kissinger, The White House Years, (Boston, Little Brown, 1979), 330.
Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle”, 285.
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achieved in 1972. As an investigation team of the “secret agreement” notes, Wakaizumi’s
role in the negotiation with Kissinger should be given a credit for opening up the secret
channel. Otherwise the reversion would not have been achieved.28 However, on the other
hand, as he admitted himself, his responsibility for committing the negotiation cannot be
overestimated.29 Since he was preoccupied with his overriding mission for Okinawa’s
successful reversion to the Japanese homeland, he overlooked the influence of the
negotiation on Japanese society. His strong thoughts on Okinawa drove him to complete
his overriding mission as a Prime Minister’ emissary, however, he spent the rest of his life
feeling a sense of remorse.
Combine with the declassified documents from MOFA and DNSA, and
especially Wakaizumi’s personal account show that the reversion of Okinawa is deeply
linked with the experience of atomic bombs in August 1945, the United States occupation
of Japan in the postwar Japan, and the Cold War in the Far East, as well as both Nixon
and Sato’s political predicaments. The reversion of Okinawa was impossible without the
Cold War global context. As soon as Japan surrendered, Japan was extremely worried
about its nation’s survival. However, the Cold War unexpectedly allowed Japan to pursue
economic affluence and regain its territories. The declassified documents and
Wakaizumi’s confessions show that Japan had sacrificed to get peace and wealth.

28
29

An Investigation Team, Iwayuru, 79.
Wakaizumi, Tasaku, Acknowledgement.
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II.

Surrender, Occupation and Independence

“Mr. Yoshida,” Wakaizumi’s code name at the time of negotiating with Kissinger as “Dr.
Jones,” was name after former Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida.30 Shigeru Yoshida, who
was a former foreign ministry bureaucrat and ambassador to London, became a Prime
Minister on May 22, 1946. Because of his anti-war stance, he was purged during the
wartime and after the devastating defeat, Yoshida came back to the Japanese politics. His
anti-war stance was convenient for the United States. Under his administration, Japan
started to rebuild the nation.
After Japan’s surrender, the United States’ almost seven year occupation ended with
Japan’s independence in 1952. The San Francisco Peace Treaty, signed on September 8,
1951, officially ended WWII in the Pacific and promised Japan’s independence. At the
same time, the United States and Japan also signed a security treaty, which allowed the
United States to maintain armed forces on Okinawa that could be “utilized to contribute
to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East.”31 As article 14 of
Peace Treaty with Japan states, “Allied Powers waived all reparations claims of the Allied
Powers, other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of any action
taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war, and claims of

30

Wakaizumi, Tasaku, 289.
The Security Treaty between the United States and Japan: See Nihongaikoubunsho Dejitaruakaibu
Heiwajouyakunikansuruchousho Daigosatu (Diplomatic Documents Digital Archive, Documents on Peace
Treaty with Japan, Vol. 5)
31
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the Allied Powers for direct military costs of occupations.”32
Despite being a defeated country, the Allied powers did not require Japan to make
reparation payments. However, as historian John W. Dower argued, “Japan had paid a
considerable price for sovereignty and 1951 Security Treaty with Japan was the most
inequitable bilateral agreement the United States had entered into after the war.”33 As
San Francisco Peace Treaty set up, the United States would have the right to exercise all
and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and
inhabitants of Okinawa.34 Because of the treaty, the country was divided. Dower says
that the detachment of Okinawa from the rest of Japan turned Okinawan society and
economy into “a grotesque appendage to the U.S. nuclear strategy in Asia.”35 However,
there was not a “thirty-eight parallel” like Korea, there was no division, which had
divided the country into two like Germany, and the Cold War never drew a line between
North and South in Japan, unlike Vietnam. Nevertheless, Dower says, “the emotional and
politically charged climate of the years that followed Japan’s accommodation to
American Cold War policy.”36
32

Peace Treaty with Japan, Article 14. : See Heiwajouyakunikansuruchousho, Vol.5.
John W. Dower, Ways of Forgetting, Ways of Remembering: Japan in the Modern World, (Perseus
Distribution, New York, 2012), 197.
34
See Treaty of Peace with Japan, Article3, “Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States
to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering
authority, Nansei Shoto south29°north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands), Nanpo
Shoto south of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Island and the Volcano Islands) and Parece
Vela and Marcus Island. Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United
States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over
the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.”
35
Dower, Ways of Forgetting, 197.
36
Ibid, 197.
33
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Although he did not dismiss the profit which the San Francisco system brought to
the postwar japan, such as economical flourish, Shin Tokuju, which means as the great
profits and market breakthrough to Japan because of the Korean War and the Vietnam War.
Despite the great profit from the San Francisco system, “the occupation and the Cold War
settlement drew a “thirty-eight parallel” through the very heart of the Japanese people.”37
Yet, about 20 years later from the Japan’s independence, the “thirty-eight parallel” was
removed and Okinawa was back to the Japanese administration.
On the other hand, Gilbert Rozman of Princeton University, and Tsuyoshi
Hasegawa, a historian at the University of California at Santa Barbara, argue that the
experience of the atomic bombs instilled in the Japanese people that sense of
victimization.38 Hasegawa pushes his argument further and strongly argues that the sense
of victimization discouraged the Japanese to face its militaristic past and genuine
commitment to take moral responsibility.39 Because of its unconditional surrender in
1945, Japan lost its empire, was disarmed, demilitarized, and democratized by the GHQ’s
peace constitution. By the early 1950s, however, the United States made Japan promise to
rebuild its army, despite the Japanese sense of victimization from the atomic bombs and
the attachment for the peace constitution which Douglas MacArthur had gifted to Japan.
37

Ibid, 197.
Gilbert Rozman, Japan’s Response to the Gorbacheve Era, 1985-1991: A Rising Superpower
Views a Declining One, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992),12-13. See also, Tsuyoshi Hasegawa,
Antou, Starin, Toruman to Nipponkoufuku, (Racing the Enemy, Stalin, Truman, and the Japan’s Surrender),
(Tokyo, Chuokoubunsha, 2006), 514-516.
39
Hasegawa, Antou, 515.
38
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In the postwar years, the intensified Cold War divided the world into two while
Japan was isolated from other countries because of the U.S.-dominated occupation. In
October 1949, the People’s Republic of China was established, and the next year, June
1950, the Korean War started. The East-West tension became more intensified after the
WWII and Japan emerged as a geostrategic assest for the United States. On September 7,
1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson agreed
on a peace treaty with Japan that provided the United States the right to maintain armed
forces in Japan, “wherever, for so long and to such extent as it deems necessary.”40
However, five month before Acheson and Johnson agreed this point, Prime
Minister Yoshida sent Hayato Ikeda, Finance Minister, secretly to offer the United States
to provide military bases in Japan.41 After the establishment of PRC in 1949, the United
States took precautions against Communist China and USSR.42 The United States
worried about the Soviet Union and Communist China together could have substantial
capabilities of influencing Japan’s future behavior, and at the same time, the US
government remained determined to maintain its forces in Japan for the purpose to
helping to maintain security in that area to protect the security of the United States and to

40

“The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson)”, September 7, 1950. Foreign
Relation of the United States (FRUS), 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Vol. VI. 1293-1295.
41
“Discussion of Japanese Peace Treaty with Mr. Ikeda, finance Minister of Japan,” May “, 1950,
FRUS, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Vol. VI.: Ikeda delivered the personal message from Prime Minister
Yoshida to Joseph M. Dodge, who was a Financial Adviser to the Supreme Commander and Fiscal Adviser
to the United Secretary of the Army.1194-1195.
42
“Courses of Action With Respect to Japanese Peace Settlement,” January 17, 1950, FRUS, 1950,
Far East the Pacific, Vol. VI. 1119.
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conduct its relations with Far East to encourage the pro-Western orientation of Japan and
other non-communist nations.43
Prime Minister Yoshida’s intention was to avoid the Allied powers to put the
Japanese government a decided disadvantage, which would prevent Japan’s independence
and dignity as a sovereign nation. Yoshida took the advantage of the United States’
position in the Cold War in East Asia, and offered the United States government to
maintain its military base to promote holding the peace conference at an early date.
Yoshida’s desire for the independence and his intention to avoid harsh condition at the
peace conference, and the United States’ anticommunist policy in East Asia brought
benefit to each other. Finally, on November 24, 1950, the United States’ government
revealed “Statement of Principles Regarding a Japanese Peace Treaty, which says the
allied nation waived the right to claim reparation of WWII and the independence.”44
However, the United States still worried about the USSR and Communist China.
Whereas, at the meeting with Prime Minister Yoshida on January 29, 1951, John Foster
Dulles, an advisor to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, demanded Japan rebuild its
army.45 Needless to say, Prime Minister Yoshida did not want to rearm in Japan. Yoshida

43

“Courses of Action With Respect to Japanese Peace Settlement,” January 17, 1950, FRUS, 1950,
Far East the Pacific, Vol. VI. 1119.
44
“Daiichijinichibeikoushounotamenojunbisagyou” (Preparation for the First U.S-Japan
Negotiation) , Nihongaikoubunsho Vol. 1, Heiwajouyaku,III (Documents on Peace Treaty), 58. See also:
“1951 nen 1 gatsu – 2 gatsu nodaiichijikoushou” (The First Negotiation January to February, 1951),
Nihongaikoubunsho Vol.2, Heiwajouyaku, IV, 3.
45
“1951 nen 1 gatsu – 2 gatsu nodaiichijikoushou” (The First Negotiation January to February, 1951),
Nihongaikoubunsho Vol.2, Heiwajouyaku, IV, 12.
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stressed that “the danger that any precipitate rearmament would bring back the Japanese
militarists who had now gone underground and military.” Also, he stated that “it would be
necessary to adopt legislation which would ensure that the military could not take over
the Government.”46
Another point the prime minister emphasized was the economy. Yoshida thought
that “Japan was a proud country and did not want to receive charity from anyone but the
creation of a military force just at the time when Japan was beginning to get on its feet
financially would be severe strain and probably result in a lower standard of living.”47
More importantly, Yoshida understood the Japanese people’s antiwar sentiment. Yoshida’s
feelings were complicated. To be independent from the United States, rearmament of the
country was necessary. Even though the wound of war had not yet healed, Yoshida well
understood that being collaborative to the United States was the easiest way to achieve its
independence.48
On February 3, 1951, Yoshida made extremely difficult decision. In 2002, Japanese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs declassified the documents regarding the San Francisco Peace
Treaty and revealed the existence of Yoshida’s promise to Dulles. Yoshida issued the
document named, “Initial Steps for Rearmament Program,” and promised that “security
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forces, land and sea, totaling 50,000 will be created” and “the 50,000 men will mark the
start of Japan’s new democratic armed forces.”49

The negotiation between Yoshida and

Dulles started to be processed smoothly.
At the final stage of the negotiation, Yoshida sent a document concerning the
islands to be placed under trusteeship. Although Yoshida noted that this “is not intended
as a request for modification of the principles stipulated in the peace treaty,”50 he said
that regarding the Nansei Archipelago, the Bonis, and other islands, it is “the Japanese
desire” and “aspiration” that “in establishing a trusteeship system the American
government will avoid incorporating in the basic instruments, including the trusteeship
agreement, any provision that might preclude the realization.”51 Most importantly,
Yoshida mentioned in the document that some 8,000 inhabitants of the islands were
forced to evacuate to Japan proper because of WWII. They have not yet been permitted to
return to their home islands. Thus, it is desired that doing back to their native islands and
“the American government is requested to consider their resettlement at the earliest
possible date.”52
The Americans treated Yoshida’s request generously. The United States sought
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“scrupulously to conform to their declaration, “no aggrandizement, territorial or other.”53
Yoshida was told that the question of future of the islands was only for allied
determination, but the United States would be willing to receive Japanese suggestion
regarding practical details.54 The United States was not interested in acquiring
sovereignty, or more like the Americans were concerned if Japan renounces sovereignty
in favor of no one because this would create a chaotic international situation.55 If Japan
gave up on sovereignty in favor of no one in particular, the victors in the war over Japan,
including “U.S.S.R.”.56
Yoshida wrote that it was historically necessary to have Security Treaty with the
United States and without the U.S military presence in Japan, Japan would have been
subject to invasions by neighboring countries, such as U.S.S.R, PRC, Korea, and
Taiwan.57 Since Yoshida believed that depending on the United States for the Japan’s
national security was the only way to assure the security of his country and criticized
people who opposed having the U.S. military presence in Japan that they were ungrateful
for the United States. This Security treaty was renewed in January 1960 by Prime
Minister Sato’s brother, Prime Minster at that time, Nobusuke Kishi58 and President
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Dwight D. Eisenhower.
Renewal of the bilateral U.S-Japan security treaty provoked massive protests in
Tokyo.59 After the terrible Korean War, the Cold War had produced the bloody Vietnam
War and the U.S. military bases in Japan played crucial role in the wars in Asia. The
dilemma between a sense of guilt for participating brutal wars in Asia and the peace
constitution had frustrated the Japanese and the frustration had produced a pressure for
reversion of Okinawa. Edwin O. Reischauer, an ambassador to Japan from 1961 to 1966
recalled about Japan in 60’s and the rise of the pressure for reversion of Okinawa that
“along with increased worries over Vietnam war, there was a considerable rise of interest
in the Okinawa irridenta in Japan, and within two years the clamor for “reversion” had
become intense.”60 Almost a million Japanese in Okinawa needed to be under American
authority seemed intolerable to many Japanese, Reischauer noted.61 Born in Japan and
speaking fluent Japanese, and being the most popular ambassador among the Japanese,
Reischauer described the situation was showing “unusual the Japanese psychology had
been after the war, and also the racist attitudes Americans had brought with them to
Asia.”62 Moreover, the sentiment of Okinawans and desire for the reversion was stronger
than the Japanese in mainland. Since Okinawa used to be an independent kingdom, their
59
60

Dower, Ways of Forgetting, 132.
Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan: The Story of a Nation, (New York, Alfred A. Knopf Publisher, 1980),

317-318.
61

Ibid.

62

Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan: The Story of a Nation, (New York, Alfred A. Knopf Publisher,
1980), 317-318.

23

culture, dialect and history were different from mainland Japan. Beside, from the
experience of suffering the war, the Okinawan resented their country. However, according
to Reischauer, “American military rule made them the most patriotic of all Japanese, and
they began clamoring for return to Japan.”63
III.

Before the Negotiation

As pressures to revert Okinawa were rising in Japan, the Johnson administration
contemplated the reversion around September 1966. According to an interim report of the
State Department, where Defense Department and the CIA referred to “Our Ryukyu
(Okinawa) Bases”, it was reported that the US government should “emphasize to the
Japanese government the importance of maintaining the operational capability of the
Ryukyuan bases”.64 Two years after this report, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense, Morton Halperin told the Foreign Ministry’s American Bureau Director,
Fumihiko Togo, that obtaining a guarantee for the right of re-entry and transit of nuclear
weapons in times of emergency from the Japanese government is an “absolute minimum”
condition. However, Halperin reminded Togo that the U.S congress would be strongly
opposed to the removal of nuclear weapons even if the rights were to be assured.65
When Nixon entered office in 1969, the question of the reversion again came under
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specific review. Finally, on May 28, 1969, National Security Decision Memorandum
(NSDM) No.13, a “critically important historical document” that defined the United
States’ basic position on the reversion of Okinawa, emerged. There were three major
points of this memorandum. First, if Japanese officials agreed to the “essential elements”
governing U.S military use in Okinawa, the United States would agree to reversion in
1972. Second, the U.S. government sought “maximum free conventional use” of the
military base, particularly with respect to Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Third, Washington
wanted to retain nuclear weapons on Okinawa, but indicated that the President would
consider, at the final stages of negotiation, “the withdrawal of the weapons while
retaining emergency storage and transit rights, if other elements of the Okinawan
agreement are satisfactory”66 .
Until May 1969, the US had concluded that nuclear weapons in Okinawa would be
removed if the conditions were right. However, in a time of emergency, the US would
require “re-entry” and “transit” right of nuclear weapons. Thus, the United States position
at this first stage of negotiation was to insist on the right of retaining nuclear weapons in
Okinawa and sought cooperation and assistance from the Japanese government to achieve
this end. The Nixon administration wanted concessions from Japan, stalling the decision
about the nuclear issue until the last stage of the negotiation.
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On the other hand, Japan took a hardline position regarding the nuclear-free
reversion. Sato defined the position of the Japanese government on the question of
reversion without nuclear weapons in his policy statement to the Diet (the Japanese
parliament) and delivered four major nuclear policies: sticking to the three nonnuclear
principles, working toward nuclear disarmament, relying on the US nuclear umbrella and
promoting peaceful uses of atomic energy.67 At this point, Sato would negotiate with the
United States without secret negotiation and he assumed that nuclear-free reversion
without any condition remained possible. Under the Prime Minister’s order, the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs tried to avoid making eyes-only documents regarding the nuclear issue
and containing every detail that would reach agreement in Joint Communique.68After
NSDM13, Sato sent Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi ] to Washington for negotiations
with Secretary of State William P. Rogers. Aichi’s two meeting with Rogers were
unsuccessful with regard to the nuclear-free reversion and Aichi recognized that it was
impossible to obtain a U.S. agreement to remove nuclear weapons. Despite Aichi’s
diligent efforts, he failed to make the US understand Japan’s apprehension of retaining
nuclear weapons on Okinawa. At the meeting in June, Undersecretary of State U. Alexis
Johnson, a former US ambassador to Japan, suggested making a confidential formula
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regarding the removal of nuclear weapons in Okinawa.69 Aichi refused the suggestion
and never expected that Sato would sign a secret agreement with Nixon just several
months later.
When the negotiations over Okinawa’s reversion stalled, Walt Rostow, national
security adviser under President Johnson, made an unofficial visit to Japan from June
10-19, 1969. Kei Wakaizumi, a professor of Kyoto Sangyo University and an academic
expert who advised Sato on foreign affairs and related issues, especially Okinawa, held
several discussions with him regarding Okinawa’s future. Rostow told Wakaizumi that the
best way to solve the Okinawa issue was to establish “a confidential communication
channel

between the Japanese and American leaders, via Kissinger’s office.”70 A few

days after Rostow left Tokyo, Wakaizumi went to see Sato as a member of the
government’s Central Deliberative Council of Education. Although the meeting was
unrelated to the Okinawa issue, Wakaizumi told Sato about the need of establishing a
confidential communication channel and approaching President Nixon directly through
Henry Kissinger.71
As Rostow told Wakaizumi, the national security advisor was “enjoying rapidly
increasing influence” in shaping American foreign relations72 Certainly, Nixon’s foreign
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policy heavily dependent on Kissinger. U. Alexis Johnson laster described the triangular
relationship between Nixon, Kissinger and Rogers. According to Johnson, Kissinger
developed his relationship with Nixon more confidently since the beginning of the Nixon
administration and established his ascendancy in foreign policy areas because of the
relationship. Besides, Kissinger had been disgusted with the State Department and he
formed diplomatic policy on his own.73 Thus, establishing a backchannel and talking
with Henry Kissinger emerged as the bset way to start negotiatings over the reversion.
Sato was initially reluctant to open the “political hotline.” According to Sato’s diary,
before Wakaizumi’s departure to Washington, Sato wrote that Wakaizumi “wants” to visit
and talk to Kissinger, not “negotiate.” Sato also implied it was Wakaizumi who wanted to
have a talk with Kissinger, not the Prime Minister. From this perception gap between
Wakaisumi and Sato, it is assumed that Sato wanted to view this channel as one of a
number of competing sources of information.74 Wakaizmi understood that Sato’s desire
for a nuclear-free reversion and Sato’s wish to avoid making a secret agreement regarding
nuclear weapons.
Also, Wakaizumi knew that because of the “three non-nuclear principles” Sato, had
declared, making a secret deal in the case of nuclear weapons would be hard to get away
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with.75 Nevertheless, Wakaizumi was not happy with Sato’s attitude and he felt a deep
need of some form of secret agreement to accomplish a nuclear-free reversion.
However, Sato’s aim in sending Wakaizumi to Washington was to find out what
Kissinger proposed to do about Okinawa’s reversion. The four major points of the basic
position of the Japanese Government were (1) a nuclear-free reversion (2) encouraging
the use of prior consultation (3) the possibility to accept the introduction of nuclear
weapons into Okinawa (4) and “the avoidance of any special arrangement or secret
pact.”76
As the prime minister’s personal representative, Wakaizumi left Washington on
July 14, in complete secrecy. Before his departure, Wakaizumi and Sato met several times.
Through these meetings, Wakaizumi felt “anxious” about Sato’s “apparent failure
properly to grasp the significance of the proposed meeting with Kissinger.” For
Wakaizumi, even though he was aware that he was not working for a government and that
his task was “access to the heart of Henry Kissinger,” he also was aware that the channel
that he was trying to open might be a crucial route in the negotiations and he was not
going to travel to Washington just for a fact-finding mission.77 However, compared to
Wakaizumi’s anxiety that the secret agreement regarding the nuclear issue would be
inevitable, Sato’s perception was more casual and Sato’s low sense of responsibility made
75
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Wakaizumi worry about the future of the negotiations.78

IV.

The Backchannel, Jones, Yoshida and their Friends

“Only the four of us know” Henry Kissinger said to Wakaizumi, assuring the Japanese
representative that the channel is absolutely confidential. To protect the confidentiality of
the channel, Wakaizumi and Kissinger decided on code-names for each other. Kissinger
was to be referred to as “Dr. Jones” and Wakaizumi as “Mr. Yoshida”. Although “Yoshida”
is a commonplace name in Japan, this name was taken from former Prime Minister,
Shigeru Yoshida, a politician Sato had long admired. They also agreed to call each other’s
respective leaders as “your friend” and “my friend”. They hoped that these codenames
would allow them to hold conversations over international phone network without
concerns that their discussions were being eavesdropped.
After the meeting between Wakaizumi and Kissinger in July, the confidential
channel was officially established. Kissinger recalled that this encounter with “a scout”
was the beginning of “an intricate Kabuki play.”79 At this stage, Wakaizumi asked
Kissinger two major questions. (1) To “what extent Nixon is prepared to go along with
Sato?”; and (2) what was Nixon thinking on “the subject so-called ‘emergency free use?’”
Wakaizumi inquired about Nixon’s intension to denuclearize Okinawa, and explained to
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Kissinger that Sato cannot “publicly admit that the U.S is free to use the bases freely in
emergencies after the reversion.”80 To these questions, Kissinger told Wakaizumi that the
United States’biggest concern was “the unrestricted emergency use” of military bases on
the island.
Since 1969, when the United States and Japan agreed to the Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security, there had been a “prior consultation system” which required
the US to notify Japan when American armed forces changed their equipment, and the use
of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to be undertaken
from Japan.81 Thus, the United States needed to know what kind of “guarantees that they
can expect” concerning the unrestricted use of the bases and the reintroduction of nuclear
weapons under the prior consultation system.82
For the United States, Okinawa was a “territory given after a huge amount of blood
spilled” during the Pacific War.83

In short, Sato was asking Nixon to hand the territory

back to Japan for free when the United States remained deeply involved in the Vietnam
War. This seemed unfair to the United States. However, Nixon, who was “an expert
diplomat with a constant interest in international affairs,” was not going to agree to the
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reversion of Okinawa to Japanese control without engaging in some “hard-bargaining.”84

V.

The Complications, Nuclear and Textiles

President Nixon had “a sore point”85, textiles. During the 1968 presidential

election

campaign, Nixon made promises to protect Southern textile manufactures in return for
their votes in the November election. Nixon concluded an agreement with South Carolina
Senator Strom Thurmond and pledged that he would take the necessary to extent “the
concept of international trade agreement to all other textiles articles involving wool,
man-made fibers and blends.” It was known as the “Southern Strategy” which was an
agreement between Nixon and Thurmond.86 Nixon wanted to “make” a credible
assurance that Japan would cut back textile exports to the United States.
On its surface, Nixon’s “Southern Strategy” looked unrelated to the Okinawan
reversion case. However, this textile issue would be connected with the negotiations and
bothered both “Dr. Jones” and “Mr. Yoshida.” This textile issue was the reason for the
complexity of their “Kabuki play,” which Kissinger described as a “case of comedy,
frustration, and near fiasco.”87
Originally, Kissinger thought it was inappropriate to “pick out one industry for
special consideration until the overall political and economic studies had been completed.”
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But Kissinger, who was a “political amateur,” was instructed by Nixon that he meant to
carry out the textile agreement and Kissinger should contribute to this goal. Although
Kissinger admitted that his “ignorance of this subject was encyclopedic,” the same could
also be said for Wakaizumi.88 “I might have encouraged the process (of give and take
diplomacy) by suggesting a possible trade-offs directly to the prime minister. More
seriously, I was poorly informed and ill equipped to judge the substance of the
concessions and demands on either side,” Wakaizumi noted his regret regarding textile
fiasco.
On September 26, Kissinger finally told Wakaizumi that the important textiles issue
was significantly affecting Nixon’s prestige.89 Even though the talks about prior
consultation in the case of emergency can be carried out easily, the textiles were an issue
on which he made a commitment in the campaign. This textile issue was President
Nixon’s strong “wish” and it needed to be solved for Nixon’s prestige.
On September 30, Kissinger handed two papers to Wakaizumi. According to
Wakaizumi, that day was a significant day of the negotiations. The first one was about
textiles. By this time, the textile issue became “a demand” from “a strong wish” of Nixon.
Although this textile issue was “not a major national issue,” it concerned the president’s
credibility and Kissinger and Nixon were eager for Sato to “personally ensure that the
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matter goes through smoothly.”90 The second was about nuclear weapons. The United
States agreed that the nuclear weapons should be removed from Okinawa. However,
unless the Japanese guaranteed in times of emergencies, “the reintroduction of nuclear
weapons and their transportation,” the U.S would not hand Okinawa back to Japan.
For Japan, of course, a nuclear-free reversion was a national sovereignty issue and
the textile question was merely the concern of a single industry. Wakaizumi was “unaware
of the risk” that the textile issue might pose and an “entirely separate concern” linked
with Okinawa’s reversion when his secret negotiation had started.91
Sato was overwhelmed by Nixon and Kissinger’s demand.92 He felt confused that
President Nixon said that Okinawa would not be returned without a guarantee from Japan
permitting the reintroduction of nuclear weapons in times of emergency. Also, the
condition to remove nuclear weapons will have to be accepted as “a part of a trade-off”.93
Sato sent his envoy, “Mr. Yoshida” to achieve “his goal of securing President Nixon’s
agreement to a nuclear-free reversion of Okinawa.” Nevertheless, his envoy came home
with “what turned out to be a burdensome package as collateral”.94
The negotiation of Okinawa’s reversion was Japan’s “effort to regain lost territory.”
Since this was “peaceful diplomacy”, diplomacy that was without the resort to armed
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force, it was inevitable to compromise through bargaining with the United States.
Although Wakaizumi understood “a basic outlook on diplomacy and international power
politics”, textiles were not the most important issue for Japan. More important, he was
“reluctant to see the issue tied up with the Okinawa question and, therefore, was
unprepared psychologically to examine the question in depth”95.

VI.

The Summit and the Aftermath

To ensure the secrecy of the agreement, Kissinger and Wakaizumi agreed that only “Dr.
Jones” and “friends” would be present at its signing. .

In a small room next to the Oval

Office which is only used by presidents,. Nixon invited Sato into the room and closed the
door behind people. Kissinger entered the room by a separate entrance with two copies of
the minutes.96 Thus, the agreed minute was signed. Nearly four decades later, Sato’s son,
Shinji Sato announced that he had found the signed agreed minute.97 They also decided
to use codes. “Item 1” as the nuclear issue, “Item 2” as Textiles, “Extra 1” as the hotline,
and “The small room” as the agreed minutes.
Item1.
President Nixon expressed “his deep understanding and assured Prime Minister
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Sato that […] the reversion of Okinawa would carried out in a manner consistent with the
policy of the Japanese Government as described by Prime Minister.”98 This was a
success for Sato, who was well aware of Japanese sentiments towards nuclear weapons.
Sato made sure to convey this point to Nixon. Based on documents on this issue, Sato
genuinely concerned that appealing to the Japanese public that he got Nixon notice that
the nuclear-free reversion was more important than anything else.
However, in the agreed minutes on reintroduction following a nuclear-free reversion
of nuclear weapons to Okinawa should an emergency arise was as follows, “in time of
great emergency the United States Government will require the re-entry of nuclear
weapons and transit rights in Okinawa with prior consultation with the Government of
Japan. The United States Government would anticipate a favorable response.”99
By signing the minutes at the meeting, although giving Okinawa back to the
Japanese administration, the United States could maintain not only its military presence in
Okinawa but also its rights to use Okinawa for the re-entry and transit of nuclear weapons.
Wakaizumi felt guilty for making this agreed minute. He described his feeling as “I was
very conscious of the serious political repercussions that would occur in Japan should the
document cease to be ‘top secret’, although I assumed that the likelihood of this ever
98
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occurring was relatively low.”100 He was faced with a dilemma between the realism of
international relations and the aspirations of the Japanese people and the nuclear-free
reversion. However, he deeply understood that the paper that Wakaizumi and Kissinger
drafted was “the basic pro quo” to realize the reversion and without the paper, there was
no possibility of the territory being returned back to Japan. Wakaizumi was desperate to
get Okinawa back from the United States. To achieve the reversion, there was no other
option to accept the U.S. to re-entry and transit their nuclear weapons into Okinawa.
However, as the declassified document that Sato’s son revealed shows, the
reversion of Okinawa did not end the Japan’s postwar period, but strengthen the
dependent relations between the U.S. and Japan. Since Sato and Wakaizumi conclude this
secret agreement with betraying the Japanese public trust, the Japanese people reassured
that the reversion of Okinawa had to be achieved with no sacrifice. Although Japan made
a great sacrifice by allowing the U.S. to reintroduce nuclear weapons into Japan despite
the Japanese sense of victimization

Item 2: Obviously, for Nixon and Kissinger, Item 2 was more significant than the
nuclear issue. At first, Kissinger suggested the textile issue should be dealt with on the
first day. Wakaizumi disagreed with Kissinger, of course. Sato’s primary object in this
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summit was to negotiate the reversion of Okinawa. Wakaizumi convinced Kissinger how
the Okinawa issue was related to “the basic view of the substance and purpose of the
summit” and Kissinger agreed that the Okinawa issue would take place in the meeting on
the morning of day one.101 Furthermore, they decided to exclude the subject of textile
from the joint communiqué.102 If any reference to the textiles were made in the joint
communiqué, regardless of the content, it would obviously suggest that “some sort of deal”
had been struck. The Japanese media in Japan were citing demands, especially from the
textile industry, to resist “any trade-off between textiles and Okinawa.” The Japanese
people believed that Okinawa was sacred Japanese territory and thought that it would be
unacceptable to see Okinawa traded for textiles. Hence, the textile question needed to be
concealed.
However, the Americans had assigned an extremely high level of priority to the
textiles, and for Nixon, his ‘Southern Strategy’ was crucial not only for his prestige, but
also for his political future. Since Nixon understood Sato’s political predicament, it was
inevitable for Sato to cooperate with Nixon to keep amicable bilateral relations.
At the meeting on the second day, November 21, following the scenario of the
summit, first, Nixon would “speak about the importance of the textile issue” and ask Sato
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for his cooperation. Then Nixon would remark that “during the upcoming multilateral
GATT conference, American hopes for an international agreement to establish some form
of comprehensive legislation on textiles. However, initially, as president, I would like to
secure Japan’s endorsement of this approach.” In replay, Sato was supposed to “clearly
indicate” the following issues. First, Sato “is personally prepared to begin substantive
discussion between the Japanese and American governments directed at some form of
concrete agreement. The deadline should be the end of this year. Second, he “personally
favors achieving some form of comprehensive regulation and intends to assume
responsibility for reaching an agreement that has these characteristics”.103
After the meeting on the second day, “Mr. Yoshida” received a phone call from
Kissinger. According to Kissinger, Nixon was not “absolutely not sure what Sato
means.”104 Despite Nixon waiting for Sato to say “comprehensive” and the expression
“by the end of this year,” Sato used neither. Sato thought he did not need to use either
word since he understood the essence of the real issue and he had decided to go ahead
with the issue. After Wakaizumi told Kissinger why Sato did not use the words, Kissinger
understood that the problem was not the terminology, but whether Sato would actually
follow through or not. Thus, nuclear-free reversion in 1972 was assured at the Nixon-Sato
summit in 1969. Wakaizumi was relieved to see the final communiqué and to know
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Kissinger had kept the promise.105 Finally, Wakaizumi thought his mission as “Mr.
Yoshida” was over and he was freed from this secret negotiation.
On January 17, a few months after the summit, Wakaizumi received a phone call
from “Dr. Jones.”. Kissinger told Wakaizumi, “We’re completely confused by the
situation and have no idea what you’re thinking and planning to do next. What has
happened to your friends ‘by the end of December promise?’”106 This phone call from
“Dr. Jones” brought Wakaizumi back to “the world that he had thought he put safely
behind him.”107

From this phone call, the negotiations over the textile issue ran into

rough waters. This failure to resolve the textile question “poisoned” U.S-Japan relations.
For people in the United States, Japanese “arrogance and intransigence on the textiles
symbolized Japan’s relentlessness in pushing export sales heedless of their impact on the
world economy.” To take revenge for Sato’s betrayal on the textile issue, Nixon warned
Japan that if an agreement on textiles were not reached by October 15, 1971, he would
invoke the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, “which gave the President power to
regulate a wide range of international transactions in any period of national emergency
declared by the President.”108 Nixon took Sato’s failure to deliver on his end of the
bargain took very personally and “this resentment contributed to Nixon’s willingness,

105

Wakaizumi, Best Course, 302.
Telephone Conversation between Henry Kissinger and "Mr. Yoshida" (Kei Wakaizumi) about
Textile Negotiations, 17 January,1970, DNSA, Japan and the U.S., Doc# JU01184
107
Wakaizumi, Best Course, 326.
108
Destler, Fukui, Sato, Textile Wrangle, 271.
106

40

even eagerness to administer rebuffs to Japan on other policy issues.109
When Wakaizumi came back from Washington with the textile question in
November 15, 1969, Sato genuinely wanted to help Nixon as a politician and as a friend,
if he was really in trouble. Also, Sato well understood that it would be better to cooperate
with Nixon to make the negotiations smooth and for better U.S.-Japan relations. In his
diary, Sato wrote that he was “inspired” by Wakaizumi’s “enthusiastic” report from
Washington.110

However, Sato’s attitude toward this textile issue was very casual and

did not have “any detailed strategy and tactics.”111

VII.

Conclusion

The reversion of Okinawa came with a heavy price. Japan had paid more than $320
million to get Okinawa back without nuclear weapons. However, since Japan chose to
consistently follow the Japanese Constitution, Article IX, and the three nonnuclear
principles, and kept rushing toward economic prosperity, Japan came to pay higher price
for the reversion of Okinawa. Japan got Okinawa back at the cost of being a “fool’s
paradise.”112
Not only Wakaizumi, Reischauer also noted that “the vast majority of Japanese,
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who had grown up since the war, were in no doubt as to who they were and were
perfectly content about it. Science and technology and a vast store of Western culture
were as much part of their heritage as of most Westerns, and they saw no conflict between
this and what they had derived from traditional Japanese culture.” Both Wakaizumi and
Reischauer thought it was a problem that the Japanese people’s unconcern with ultimate
origins.
Wakaizumi’s thoughts on Okinawa were strong. What pushed him to achieve the
secret negotiation as “Mr. Yoshida” was because of his thoughts on “200,000 souls who
died for their country, on both side, including many Okinawan civilians.”113 For “those
who fell, in the horror and chaos of the Okinawa battle”114 in the spring of 1945,
Okinawa’s reversion to the Japanese homeland remained Wkaizumi’s primary mission.
As well as Wakaizumi, Prime Minster Sato desired to achieve the reversion. Both of them
were ready to pay a price for the negotiation. Therefore, the secret agreement was
concluded and Sato was going to control the textile industry in order to meet Nixon’s
demand. Concluding the secret-agreement was “the best course available”115 for them.
However, Wakaizumi and Sato need to be judged. Especially for the Sato’s Nobel
Peace Prize for his proposal of the three non-nuclear principles in 1974 and failure to
carry out his promise to Nixon have to be judged. The secret-agreement has to be judged
113
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and examined in the light of why they had to make it secret, not only in the light of
Wakaizumi and Sato’s betrayal of the Japanese. For Japan, maintaining the U.S. military
presence in Okinawa was necessary because of Article IX. As the documents on Japanese
Peace Treaty in 1951 show, although Prime Minister Yoshida promised the United States
that Japan will rebuilt its own military, Yoshida did not announce the promise officially
because he was afraid of the public reaction. 18 years after Yoshida’s secret promise to
the United States, Japan made another secret agreement because Japan did not rebuild its
military when Yoshida promise the United States to do so.
In the postwar years, U.S. policy toward Japan had been consistent in their policy
to demilitarize, and democratize Japan. The United States government was desperate to
spread a view to developing an understanding and appreciation of American ideas. Also,
Japan’s economic recovery was a huge concern of the United States government.116
However, as the declassified documents regarding on San Francisco Peace Treaty, and the
Security Treaty between U.S. and Japan showed, the United States demanded Japan to
promise to rebuild her own army. Furthermore, twenty years later, Nixon required Japan
to cut off the Japanese textile export to the United States.
After its surrender to allied forces in 1945, Japan had no choice but to accept the
U.S. dominated occupation and democratization in order to survive as a nation state and
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bring about Japan’s economic recovery in the wake of wartime devastation. Moreover,
since the experience of the atomic bombs instilled in the Japanese people the sense of
victimization, Japan chose to consistently follow Aritcle IX of its constituation. The sense
of victimization made Yoshida keep it secret to promise the United States government that
Japan would rearm in the future, although it was the promise not being kept. Furthermore,
this San Francisco system which had placed Japan under defense umbrella of the United
States produced the dependent relationship. As Wakaizumi showed, Japan became a
country which “has been preoccupied with material, often narrowly selfish concerns.”117
Japan’s postwar economic growth was rapid. One of the main reasons why Japan could
have grown fast and miraculously was United State aid for Japan’s economic recovery.
During the Cold War, with the Constitution Article IX and the aid from U.S., Japan had
gained peace, wealth and had regained territories which had been lost in the war.
However, in the era of détente, the role of the United States in Asia was changing.
From Nixon’s point of view, the United States was “weary with war,” “disillusioned with
aid to allies” and “dismayed’ at domestic criticism.118 Nixon signaled that he would not
“leave China outside the family of nations.”119 U.S policy toward Japan in the postwar
years was heavily based on the Cold War context. Yet, because of détente, Japan should
have read Nixon’s sign.
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On the other hand, since the Security Treaty of 1951, the United States kept its
military presence in Japan. In addition, despite the détente, as the negotiation over
reversion of Okinawa showed, the United States never gave up on its presence in the Far
East. The United States’ military presence in Japan used to contain the threat of
communism. However, because of détente, the U.S. presence in Asia became in the
interest of not just the U.S. but in the interest of China.120 Nixon promised China that the
United States would maintain its influence to keep the Japanese away from militarism.
Yet, in other words, this agreement showed the U.S ambition for holding hegemony in the
Far East in the future. Nixon, who was going to get what he wanted in the Okinawa
reversion negotiation, must have been extremely unhappy with Sato’s faithlessness.
Through the negotiation over the reversion of Okinawa, both of Nixon and Sato’s
political predicaments made the negotiation much more complicated than they thought.
Nixon’s excessive worry for his reelection in 1972 had produced a complication for
U.S-Japan relations. Also, since the negotiation of the reversion of Okinawa started with
Sato’s slogan during the presidential campaign for the LDP, nuclear-free reversion was
the only option that they considered. In addition to their political predicaments, the
Japanese traumatized memory of atomic bombs in Nagasaki and Hiroshima, moreover the
sense of victimization of the atomic bombs made Sato and Wakaizumi feel extremely
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guilty to trade textiles for Okinawa. The beginning of the U.S occupation after Japan’s
surrender, disarm and forced Japan to accept the Japanese Constitution, Article IX, cloud
the Japanese people’s thinking and “the country lost sights of its spiritual, cultural, and
ethical roots.”121 For Wakaizumi who kept feeling “a debt of responsibility to past
generation” and “historical obligation”, seeing the country was becoming “fool’s paradise”
must be sad. This could have been one of the reasons why he committed suicide.
During the Pacific War, innumerable death and destruction had been seen
throughout the country. The Japanese lost almost 3 million, and in China alone, about 15
million people died.122 After this horrified chaos, the Americans compelled
demilitarization and democratization. John Dower once noted in his Embracing Defeat
the U.S. occupation was “the last immodest exercise in the colonial conceit known as “the
white man’s burden.”"123 For the American, the Japanese society was “Oriental” and this
exoticism had to be “controlled by white men who were engaged in a Christian
mission.”124 Combined with the sense of victimization, American democratization of
Japan which was “a display of arrogant idealism,”125 the country was made to believe
that as far as the U.S. military presence remained, the Japanese faced its own past as a
military aggressor.
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Moreover, even though American’s occupation of Okinawa seemed
“intolerable,”126 peace and wealth that the Japanese gained after the devastated defeat in
WWII was brought by the Americans, who was an enemy in the war. Those who had
protested the renewal of the bilateral U.S-Japan security treaty127 overlooked the facts
that Japan was the defeated country and the need to understand Japan’s role in the context
of global Cold War.
The public reaction to the revelation of the secret negotiations in Japan was
scandalous not only because Sato lied to the Japanese, but also because there are still
many Japanese people who feel that Japan should never rearm, nor should the country
have anything to do with nuclear weapons. The reason why Prime Minister Yoshida could
not make it public that he promised that Japan would rearm, and Sato could not move
diplomatically was that rearmament was, and still is, a highly controversial issue for the
public in Japan. Including Wakaizumi, the Japanese opinion leaders have barely
mentioned about Japan’s rearmament and never tried to persuade the public to think about
its own national security.
As long as Japan depended on the U.S., the U.S-Japanese alliance would remain
artificial. The scandalous public reaction of the revelation of the agreement shows that the
Japanese are still feeling a sense of victimization and have not accept to take
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responsibility.128 To seek less unequal relationship and to contribute to the world
community, reviewing the history of postwar Japan in light of the Cold War is necessary
in order to face its past in the WWII and to end the postwar period, which Prime Minister
Sato desired to achieve. The declassified documents and Wakaizumi’s personal account
show that the reversion of Okinawa was not only the issue of local Okinawan, but also
Japan’s national issue. Also, the documents suggested the Japanese to consider its own
national security issue.
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